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Beyond the Participatory 
Development Impasse 
Pathways Forward to Sustainable 
Rural Development
Participatory development models remain influential within 
mainstream development institutions, despite substantial 
scholarly critique. This paper examines one case study of a rural 
development facilitator from Tamil Nadu, India, who adopted 
participatory strategies to promote transitions to ecological 
agriculture. It considers the challenges and frustrations she 
faced in adopting these strategies and their shortcomings 
in promoting meaningful, long-term transformations within 
communities. In particular, local power structures and neoliberal 
institutions that made up the local context made it difficult 
to achieve participatory development’s stated objectives. The 
case illustrates potential pathways forward beyond the current 
participatory development impasse, suggesting a modified 
participatory development model, with a stronger emphasis 
on fostering cooperative economic relations. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since its initial propagation in the 1980s, ‘participation’ has become a 
buzzword in rural development circles. From the 1990s onwards, the 
language of ‘participation’ (though perhaps not the practice) became 
embedded within development NGOs, government departments, 
and transnational institutions (Pretty 1995). Participatory rural 
development models have emphasised the importance of directly 
allowing rural communities to partake in and lead the development 
efforts that are ostensibly for their benefit. Yet, participatory 
development has also attracted substantial criticism. Critics have noted 
that when development workers take a role of ostensibly ‘facilitating’ 
local participation and local ‘leadership,’ this often masks substantial 
inequalities between ‘facilitators’ and communities (Cooke and Kothari 
2001) as well as inequalities within communities (Platteau 2004). 
Although these critics have highlighted important issues, they 
offer little in the way of alternatives. In order to overcome this 
theoretical and practical impasse in participatory development, in this 
paper I explore the work of M. Revathi, a participatory development 
worker from Tamil Nadu (India), as an in-depth case study. Revathi’s 
work highlights both the processes by which participatory strategies 
evolve and the reasons things tend to go awry. It reinforces several 
of the conclusions of previous studies regarding the shortcomings of 
participatory approaches and suggests ways that activists working on 
the ground are trying to overcome these shortcomings. I argue that 
Revathi’s attempts to adopt new approaches may have important 
lessons for the development community at large, in particular her 
adoption of a strategy that focuses on economic empowerment and 
inter-community cooperation. By critically analysing her account and 
drawing also on the experiences of the farmers and landless labourers 
with whom she has worked, I highlight possible ways forward that 
may overcome the impasses in the participatory model, particularly 
those regarding the facilitator’s role.
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND ITS CRITICS
Pioneers of participatory development proposed it as a response to 
the failures of the centralised, expert-driven development system that 
had proliferated throughout the developing world in the post-colonial 
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period. Chambers (1997), for example, emphasised that hierarchical, 
centralised, top-down development models failed to engage directly 
with local needs and subsequently did not result in sustained benefits. 
For this reason, he insists that development interventions must enlist 
local knowledge and local participation in every phase of development 
projects. Locals ‘plan, act, monitor and evaluate’ development projects 
in alignment with their own needs and aspirations (Chambers 1997, 
102). 
The participatory development paradigm raised questions 
regarding the normative role of the development worker. In the 
traditional model, the development worker may have presented as a 
‘leader’ and source of knowledge, reinforcing hierarchical relations in 
project implementation. In a more participatory model, the role and 
identity of the development worker is radically reconfigured. Chambers 
(1997, 103) is unambiguous on this point, stressing that:
Outsiders do not dominate and lecture; they facilitate, sit 
down, listen and learn. Outsiders do not transfer technology; 
they share methods which local people can use for their 
own appraisal, analysis, planning, action, monitoring and 
evaluation. Outsiders do not impose their own reality; they 
encourage and enable local people to express their own.  
Essentially, the identity of the development worker shifts from 
being a ‘leader’ or ‘expert’ to a ‘facilitator’ and ‘listener.’ This more open-
minded and receptive disposition, it is hoped, will encourage local 
people to take up leadership positions within development projects. This 
new approach was met with a great deal of enthusiasm in development 
literature. It pointed towards a model in which development workers 
could be far more confident that their interventions reflected local 
needs and aspirations – and hence would be more sustainable. 
While this approach almost reached ‘common sense’ status 
within mainstream development institutions throughout the course 
of the 1990s, it also attracted considerable scholarly critique. Critics 
pointed to the inability of participatory development to live up to 
its own standard. Cooke and Kothari (2001) note the remarkable 
naiveté of participatory development workers regarding the power 
relations between communities and themselves as ‘facilitators.’ As 
Mosse (2001) notes, despite the stated commitment to allowing 
communities to make their own decisions, facilitators are rarely passive 
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participants in the process – their input often blends imperceptibly 
with what is constructed as ‘local knowledge’ and the unequal power 
relations almost invariably result in the facilitator’s objectives being 
enacted. This may occur in subtle ways. For example, the very process 
of encouraging communities to list their problems can create the 
sense that they are ‘under-developed,’ reproducing and amplifying the 
normativity of ‘development’ as a desirable condition (Green 2010). 
From this perspective, participatory development strategies tend to 
lead to similar outcomes to traditional approaches, while the logic and 
process of participation obscure the power dynamics at play.
The participatory development model has also been criticised for 
overlooking broader, institutional power. Participatory interventions 
generally seek to find local solutions to problems that are embedded 
in much larger power structures (Cooke 2004; Green, 2000). In this 
context, some scholars have argued that only grassroots political 
empowerment of the marginalised will enable effective opposition 
to institutionalised disadvantage (Engberg-Pedersen and Webster 
2002). In most cases, participatory development initiatives are 
poorly positioned to deliver these forms of empowerment, as they 
are embedded within a neoliberal development establishment that 
reproduces disempowerment. 
A further issue is that participatory development is easily hijacked 
by local elites. Platteau (2004) outlines how, in many cases, elites are 
able to capture the resources offered by development projects and use 
them for their own private interests, whilst using the language of the 
‘common good.’ Elites are able to do this, because they are generally 
better equipped with the skills required to deal with external resources 
and are better able to speak the technical language of development 
agencies. This ‘elite capture’ is often perceived to be legitimate by 
the wider community, given the prevalence of clientelistic political 
representation in many developing countries, whereby elites act 
as gatekeepers between the wider community and the benefits of 
development. 
Elite capture may come as a result of corner-cutting by 
development organisations. To facilitate participation most efficiently, 
development organisations often attempt to work through existing 
‘community-based organisations’ (Dill 2009). These groups may be 
already dominated by local elites who maintain patron-client relations 
with the local poor, resulting in development projects that reproduce 
dependency and unequal power relations (de Wit and Berner 2009). 
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As Platteau (2004) notes, development organisations will often skip 
the more difficult work of empowerment and instead simply facilitate 
the formation of groups who ‘elect’ a leader. In most cases, elites are far 
better positioned to take up these leadership positions. 
While the studies mentioned above point to failures of participatory 
approaches to achieve their own standards, some scholars go further, 
suggesting inherent problems with the concept of participation. These 
studies have looked to local reactions to participatory projects, and 
found a considerable disconnect between participatory development 
goals and local expectations. In some cases, local people, particularly the 
marginalised, may find public participation to be highly intimidating 
and shirk away (Masaki 2010). Others see unpaid participation as 
exploitative and condescending, and would prefer more conventional 
forms of development assistance (Welker 2012). Others still may feel 
sceptical about the prospect that any local project can solve problems 
that have trans-local origins (Vincent 2004). All of this suggests that 
there is no simple overlap between participation and empowerment 
and that often the more ‘empowered’ decision may be to reject the 
offer to participate (see Hayward et al 2004). 
While there is now a substantial body of literature critiquing 
participatory development and the role of facilitators, the literature 
offers little in the way of alternatives. Often it is unclear whether 
scholars are advocating amendments to the participatory development 
framework or an all-out rejection. If the latter, it is rarely clear what 
they would suggest as an alternative framework. Perhaps due to this 
lack of a clearly articulated alternative, the assumptions of participatory 
development have remained unchallenged within development 
institutions, despite the widespread scholarly recognition that these 
principles are, to some extent, flawed. In this context, this paper 
gestures towards a reformed approach to participatory development, 
suggesting more curtailed participatory strategies that avoid some of 
the dilemmas that previous research has identified. 
CASE STUDY, REGIONAL CONTEXT, 
AND METHODOLOGY
This paper explores possible alternatives through a case study of one 
facilitator, Revathi, and her attempts to use participatory strategies 
in sustainable rural development in her home-state of Tamil Nadu, 
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India. As Flyvbjerg (2006) notes, the special methodological 
contribution of case studies lies in their capacity to falsify established 
theories. By providing evidence that goes against core assumptions 
of dominant paradigms, a well-selected case study can drive debate 
forward. This is particularly true of what Flyvbjerg terms ‘critical 
case studies,’ which are selected on the grounds that they are most 
likely to confirm the assumptions of dominant theories – since, if 
such a case is shown not to confirm these assumptions, it is highly 
unlikely that those assumptions will hold up for other cases (2006). 
As shall be shown below, Revathi’s long-term commitment to the 
spirit of participatory development and her willingness to support 
communities even at times when she lacked institutional funding 
make her efforts among the most likely to lead to successful models 
of participatory development. The fact that even in this case, many 
of the assumptions of participatory development were found not to 
hold true, suggests that they are unlikely to be confirmed in other 
instances. One further value in this focus on a single case study is 
that it allowed in-depth data to be collected by multiple methods – 
and this data made it possible to demonstrate the reasons why the 
participatory development model failed to live up to its potential. 
I use Revathi’s accounts and experiences to guide much of the 
narrative in this article. This not only provides an over-arching 
coherence to the article, but her experiences prove tremendously 
insightful in relation to the core themes I wish to explore.  Most 
studies have critiqued participatory development by drawing on the 
experiences of rural communities or of international aid workers, 
but those actually doing the groundwork of facilitation have not 
been studied in as much detail. This may be a significant oversight. 
As Ghosh (2009) outlines, development workers often have 
backgrounds as social activists and, consequently, have commitments 
towards certain principles of justice and empowerment. Nonetheless, 
they often face competing claims from donors, who may attempt to 
direct their work towards other objectives and thus feel caught in-
between. This proved true of Revathi. While her strong ideological 
commitments to empowering the poor through ecological agriculture 
initially attracted her towards participatory development models, her 
frustrations with the institutional context in which she found herself 
embedded ultimately led her to forge alternative strategies. 
Revathi has made use of participatory development strategies to 
promote what she terms ‘ecological agriculture.’ Ecological agriculture 
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involves not only the elimination of synthetic chemical inputs and 
sustainable resource management, but also attempted to establish 
self-contained ecosystems on the farm itself. Local participation 
and local knowledge are recognised as particularly important in 
promoting such sustainable models of agriculture. Pretty (1995) 
claims that sustainable agricultural development cannot be imposed 
using top-down models, as occurred with the Green Revolution. 
Sustainability itself is a contested concept and forging an effective 
approach requires mediation of diverse interests through encouraging 
participation from all relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, as Uphoff 
(2002) notes, ecological farming techniques require substantial 
knowledge of local ecological conditions. Only through involving 
local people in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
development projects, can this local knowledge be effectively utilised 
to ensure positive outcomes are sustained. Participatory processes 
encourage rural communities to develop social and human capital, 
building their capacity to cooperate to maximise the use of local 
knowledge for mutual benefit (Pretty 2002). Accumulated social 
capital then becomes the basis for the diffusion of innovation within 
local farming systems (Shaw et al 2011). 
Although Revathi has acted as a facilitator for ecological farming 
in a variety of locations, this paper focuses on her initiatives in the 
Cauvery River Delta, on the central coast of Tamil Nadu, in southern 
India. Ecological agriculture is a radical venture in this region, as 
many farmers there have taken a chemically intensive approach 
to agriculture for several decades. Due to its extensive irrigation 
systems and rich alluvial soils, the Cauvery Delta was one of a select 
few regions targeted for Green Revolution development strategies 
in the 1960s and 1970s, under the Intensive Agricultural Districts 
Program of the Government of India (Frankel 1971). This involved 
the promotion of High-Yielding Variety (HYV) rice seeds and 
chemical inputs. 
The implementation of the Green Revolution in the Cauvery 
Delta generated significant social tensions that remain relevant to 
this day. The region was already mired in high levels of class and 
caste inequality. Traditionally, rural society in Tamil Nadu has 
been structured by a relatively rigid caste hierarchy, within which 
agricultural labour is among the least valued activities (Alexander 
1975). Furthermore, as Frankel (1971) outlines, the region had, and 
continues to have, a high population density, with large numbers of 
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smallholding farmers and landless labourers. This poor majority were 
sidelined by the Green Revolution technologies, which provided 
disproportionate benefits to larger landholders with greater capital 
to invest. Furthermore, despite increased demand for labour resulting 
from the more intensive farming practices, an influx of migrant labour 
from poorer neighbouring districts resulted in a stagnation of local 
wages. Consequently, landless labourers, who made up a majority of 
families in the region, received no increased monetary benefit. Thus, 
in various ways, Green Revolution technologies served to amplify 
existing social inequality. 
Subsequent developments in the Cauvery Delta have only 
increased social polarisation and the precariousness of the rural 
poor. The liberalisation of Tamil Nadu’s economy has brought mixed 
blessings to the predominantly rural delta region. While liberalisation 
accelerated rural industrialisation, providing diversified employment 
opportunities for rural labour (Djurfeldt et al 2008), it also led to 
a removal of subsidies for agricultural inputs and deregulation of 
the rural banking sector (Harriss-White and Janakarajan 1997). 
The net effect of these policies has been increased precariousness of 
agriculture as an economic activity. Additionally, the damming of 
the Cauvery river upstream has greatly reduced the availability of 
water for irrigation in the region, further undermining production. 
As agriculture becomes less viable, small-holding farmers and 
labourers are increasingly looking to the non-agricultural sector for 
employment (Harriss, Jeyarajan and Nagaraj 2010), leading to high 
rates of rural out-migration (Djufeldt et al 2008).  
On top of these issues, the Cauvery Delta was badly affected 
by the 2004 South Asian tsunami. On December 26th 2004, a 9.3 
magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Sumatra, triggering 
a tsunami that had impacts on coastal communities across South 
Asia. While Sumatra was the worst affected, there were also huge 
amounts of damage in other parts of South-East Asia, India, and 
Sri Lanka. In India, Tamil Nadu was the worst affected state, with 
7,923 recorded deaths in the immediate aftermath, 6,023 of which 
were in the district of Nagapattinam, in the Cauvery Delta (Arya, 
Mandal and Muley 2006). The tsunami created tremendous damage 
to fishing and agriculture. Whilst substantial funds were mobilised 
in response to the tsunami by governments, NGOs and multilateral 
agencies, there was little coordination between these groups, 
leading to a somewhat chaotic disaster response (Achuthan 2009). 
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The tsunami and subsequent salinization of land in the region led 
to farmers selling their land at extremely low prices to developers, 
further accelerating the exodus from agriculture. 
Revathi became well-known for using ecological techniques 
to restore lands affected by the tsunami. Yet, she has gone beyond 
disaster response, and attempted to encourage farmers to continue to 
use these techniques to develop sustainable livelihood options. Given 
the factors described above, the Cauvery Delta is a challenging terrain 
for promoting ecological agriculture. Despite a sizeable number of 
organisations promoting chemical-free farming (see Alvarez 2009, 
261-297), the shift away from agriculture in the region, particularly 
post-tsunami, poses logistical challenges. Activists are faced with the 
double challenge of developing sustainable models and sustaining 
agriculture per se. In this context, it becomes particularly important 
to demonstrate that sustainable agricultural methods can provide 
viable livelihood opportunities for smallholding farmers and landless 
labourers, alike. This has been one of Revathi’s enduring challenges.
The data presented in this paper was collected over the course of 
two periods of fieldwork. The first was in February of 2010. I stayed 
at Revathi’s demonstration farm in the Cauvery Delta and, through 
participant observation, was able to collect data on her work in reaching 
out to the local community. Interviews provided the backbone of my 
research – providing both Revathi and her rural beneficiaries with 
an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the development models 
that had been pursued.1 I conducted extensive, in-depth interviews 
with Revathi, exploring several facets of her work. I also conducted 
interviews with her staff on the farm (predominantly from labouring 
and smallholding families in the Cauvery Delta), and a focus group 
with members of the local community who were practicing ecological 
farming. The second fieldtrip occurred in December 2014. The 
follow-up field trip was conducted to determine whether Revathi’s 
initial results had been sustained over time and whether her views 
on participation had shifted. On this occasion, I conducted a further 
series of in-depth interviews with Revathi, following up on themes 
explored during the first fieldtrip. I found that with further experience 
working in the development sector, many of Revathi’s perspectives 
had shifted, and this provided greater insights into the challenges 
and shortcomings of the participatory development framework. 
During the second fieldtrip, I also hired an independent translator, 
and conducted seven interviews with members of Revathi’s target 
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communities (5 smallholding farmers, one landless labourer and 1 
large landholder) in the Cauvery Delta – including those who were 
practicing ecological farming and those who were not. This provided 
an important opportunity to cross-check Revathi’s claims and assess 
the long-term impact of her work as facilitator. 
In what follows, I tell Revathi’s story in chronological fashion. I 
begin by highlighting the reasons that Revathi adopted participatory 
models to promote ecological agriculture and then why, after several 
years of involvement, she became disillusioned with aspects of these 
models. I then reflect on the experiences of some of Revathi’s target 
communities to assess the long term impact of Revathi’s work in the 
Cauvery Delta. Considering the findings of the case study alongside 
the findings of wider literature, I conclude by considering possible 
amendments to the participatory development model that may make 
its impacts more effective, equitable and sustainable. 
M. REVATHI: ENTRY TO ECOLOGICAL 
FARMING AND THE FACILITATOR’S ROLE 
Prior to her involvement in activism, Revathi was a middle school 
science teacher in Coimbatore, a city in Western Tamil Nadu. 
Although involved in environmental politics since her student days, 
her interest in ecological farming began with her participation in 
a study of bird mortality, which she conducted with the Sálim Ali 
Centre for Ornithology and Natural History, a research and education 
centre based in Coimbatore. The project collected the bodies of birds 
from across India for post-mortem analysis and found high traces 
of pesticides such as endosulfan in the birds’ heart muscles, which 
had led to heart attacks and other diseases. Concerned for potential 
effects of endosulfan on both bird and human health, Revathi began 
to explore the reasons for farmers’ pesticide use. She did this by 
interviewing the parents and family members of her students from 
the nearby countryside. 
Revathi’s research with farmers was the starting point for her 
work as a facilitator of ecological farming. She found that farmers 
were frustrated with the increasing cost of chemical inputs and their 
resulting indebtedness. Yet, farmers also felt hopeless and lacked 
awareness of viable alternatives. Revathi thus began travelling around 
Tamil Nadu and engaging with people who were practicing chemical-
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free farming, in the hope that this would provide a model for others. 
Having seen these farmers’ results, Revathi became convinced that 
farming without chemicals and utilising ecological techniques could 
provide viable livelihood options. Nonetheless, when she took this 
information to chemical farmers, they remained sceptical. She quickly 
recognised that, as an urban outsider, farmers were incredulous as to 
whether she could really understand their position. She concluded 
that ecological farming would be more authoritative if it were part 
of a farmers’ ‘movement,’ which practicing ecological farmers could 
lead. 
This would be the beginning of an ongoing interest in ‘movements’ 
as a method of organising. For Revathi, a ‘movement’ implied a 
grassroots association of farmers that would be, in the first instance, 
a platform for knowledge sharing. By becoming connected with each 
other and sharing their experiences with different techniques, farmers 
would be better positioned for success. Through such a movement, 
chemical farmers who were curious about alternatives could visit 
chemical-free farms and see the potential of alternative techniques. 
She also asserted that, by coming together, farmers would have a 
stronger ‘voice’ to argue for the effectiveness and importance of their 
techniques to farming communities, media and policy makers. In 
this sense, Revathi’s conception of a ‘movement’ closely resembles 
that described by Dwyer (2011) as ‘grassroots movements:’ collective 
platforms that allow poor communities to collaborate to develop 
their own solutions to pressing social challenges. 
Despite hundreds of practicing ecological farmers in Tamil Nadu, 
Revathi found little evidence of any ‘movement’ linking them together. 
After enquiring with farmers, she found the foremost reason for this 
was a lack of time. Ecological farming is generally more labour-
intensive than its chemical equivalents and, consequently, farmers 
could not spend time away from their farms to promote the cause 
collectively. Revathi was still convinced of the merits of a farmer-led 
movement, but felt that by drawing on her skills in writing, teaching, 
and communication, she might play a role in linking busy ecological 
farmers with chemical farmers who were interested in alternatives. 
Thus, in early 2004, she left her job as school teacher and registered 
as a society, with the primary objective of distributing materials and 
demonstrating ecological techniques to farmers. She claims that 
even at this early stage, she had only intended to play a ‘supportive’ 
role in this initiative, as she explained in interview:
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It should be a farmers’ movement. I wouldn’t take an active 
role in that. I mean, everyday work is done by me, but I 
wouldn’t take a position in that, like president, or managing 
trustee, or any named position. All the roles are taken up by 
farmers. 
As this statement demonstrates, Revathi was, from the outset, 
concerned about being perceived to occupy a leadership role. Rather, 
she hoped to facilitate a movement that farmers would recognise as 
their own. Furthermore, given the indebtedness and poverty of many 
farming communities, she recognised she needed to articulate the 
socio-economic benefits of ecological farming, rather than simply 
focus on environment:
R: If you talk simply environment, nothing is going to happen. 
Environment issues like bird watching or nature walking, 
they are all having some impact, but this problem [of the 
threat to livelihoods] has a huge potential to operate. This 
is very important because this is involved with food security 
and our farmers’ lives. And basically environmental balance 
also. 
Author: But you felt environment wasn’t enough to mobilise 
people?
R: No, it won’t work out because most of the people were 
concentrating on economics only. More than environmental 
ideology. They are very much worried about economics. 
Whether organic farming will help them to retrieve from 
their problems. That was their question. They are not 
concerned about ecology.
Revathi thus began to promote ecological farming as an 
immediate solution to these socio-economic issues, which she claims 
generated a stronger response. This represented a decisive shift in her 
approach. Instead of simply promoting her own interest in ecological 
issues, she would engage with threats to farmers’ livelihood, survival 
and way of life, in the interest of facilitating a widespread movement 
for change amongst farmers. 
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THE 2004 SOUTH ASIAN TSUNAMI: 
CONSOLIDATING THE FACILITATIVE STRATEGY
When the tsunami hit the coast along the Cauvery Delta in 2004, 
Revathi immediately travelled there to help in the relief effort. She 
mobilised her research connections to document salt contamination 
levels in soil and ground water, which were found to be very high. It 
quickly became apparent that, while the dominant aid response was 
directed at fishing communities, the contamination of soil and irrigation 
waters would precipitate a crisis for farmers, as well. Farmers had no 
previous experience with this level of salinity and, therefore, looked to 
others in search of answers. Meanwhile, a consensus developed in the 
research community that it would take between three to five years for 
the land to become arable again. This created panic amongst farmers, 
many of whom began to sell their land at desperation prices.
Revathi was confident that, by adopting ecological techniques, 
it would be possible to reclaim contaminated lands. She developed a 
chemical-free strategy to remove salinity and aerate compacted soil, 
which the government allowed her to initiate on an experimental basis 
in one highly affected village. Revathi claimed that the techniques 
were successful, and by May of 2005, was able to announce that the 
lands on which they had been working were restored and ready for 
cultivation. Following this announcement, local authorities agreed she 
could begin work on a larger scale. She began by working on some 600 
acres of land, applying the same techniques. 
Working on a larger scale introduced new organisational challenges. 
This was the first time that Revathi’s work had required substantial 
funds. Money was required to finance machines used in the removal of 
salt, sand and mud and to train people in the techniques. Up until this 
point, she had avoided fundraising and the implementation of NGO-
style project work. She had been registered as a trust, simply adopting 
a supportive role to the development of grassroots initiatives. Knowing 
that funds would be required to expand this work, however, she 
registered as an organisation in March of 2005. Due to the emergency 
situation, the government had waived the usual requirement that an 
organisation be registered for three years before receiving foreign 
contributions. The name chosen was Tamil Nadu Organic Farmers’ 
Movement, reflecting Revathi’s continued ideological commitment 
to ‘movements’ as a mode of organisation. They successfully applied 
for funding from a German based donor organisation, which Revathi 
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suggests was supportive of her methods and did not enforce onerous 
reporting conditions upon her. 
As the work of Revathi and her team gathered pace, their success 
began to attract widespread attention from national and international 
media, academics, agricultural scientists and politicians. Encouraged 
by the positive response from outsiders, they decided to extend their 
work to the entire coast of Nagapattinam, the main coastal district 
in the Cauvery Delta. In order to reach larger numbers of farmers, 
they worked with other NGOs based in the region. They trained 
NGO workers directly, so that they could take the techniques to 
communities, and followed suggestions from NGOs regarding 
communities that were likely to be responsive to training programs. 
Revathi has documented that they provided training programs for at 
least 16,000 farmers of Nagapattinam District during the latter part 
of 2005. While it is difficult to verify such figures, farmers interviewed 
confirmed that Revathi had a substantive impact. ‘After the tsunami, at 
least 50 NGOs came,’ said one Mudaliyar, a large landholding farmer. 
‘They were mostly useless. Only Revathi and [one other activist] did 
good work.’
To ensure the impact of these interventions was sustained, Revathi 
implemented what she termed a ‘master farmer’ training model. After 
conducting two day training programs with larger groups of farmers, 
a smaller number were selected to receive more intensive training as 
‘master farmers.’ They were chosen on the basis of their interest in 
ecological farming, yet care was also taken that master farmers were 
not selected from the local elite. These farmers received their training 
free of cost, on the condition that they take the techniques to others 
and support them in their transition to ecological farming. Where 
possible, they would be matched up with a team of others in their 
village, who were termed their ‘fellow farmers.’ In Revathi’s words, 
the idea was to ‘give [the master farmers] to the community as an 
asset.’ The master farmer would provide grassroots leadership and act 
as nodes within support networks at the village and district level. They 
could also maintain communication with Revathi and other supportive 
outsiders, and call on them for additional help, where required. In the 
years that followed, this model would become a lynchpin in Revathi’s 
participatory approach, allowing her to provide guidance and support, 
whilst retaining substantial local autonomy and facilitating the 
development of leadership-from-below for ecological farming. The 
‘master farmer’ became a trusted local leadership figure, whose results 
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could be observed directly. ‘I don’t try to convince people’ said one 
master farmer, ‘my farm itself is an example. This year there was a lot 
of rain, so we had a lot of pest attacks. When the others saw that 
my farm had no pest attacks and that I was not using any chemicals, 
they started getting curious on how I did it. So that’s how I influence 
people.’ 
By the end of 2005, Revathi felt her team’s work in tsunami 
restoration in Nagapattinam was largely complete. They had attracted 
a great deal of national and international attention for their work, with 
visits from former U.S. President and U.N. ambassador, Bill Clinton, 
and former President of India, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. Clinton went on 
to recommended Revathi to governments in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, 
where there was also urgent need for tsunami restoration and both 
governments extended invitations. Thus, from January 2006 until May 
of 2009, Revathi and her family spent much of their time travelling 
around South and South-East Asia, using similar techniques to 
restore tsunami-affected land. This was followed by another project 
in West Bengal in 2009 and 2010, in which Revathi assisted farming 
communities whose lands had been damaged by Cyclone Aila. During 
this time of intensive travel, Revathi was able to maintain only sporadic 
contact with the communities she had worked with in the Cauvery 
Delta. For Revathi, this reaffirmed the need for a light-handed 
facilitator’s approach. She could not provide day-to-day support for 
farmers – she could only provide training and inspiration and develop 
their leadership potential so that they could support each other and 
manage their own ‘movement.’ As is documented below, the long-term 
impacts of this approach were mixed. 
FACILITATING COMMUNITY-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL FEDERATIONS
Between these various trips abroad, Revathi was employed by an 
international NGO2 to consolidate results in the Cauvery Delta 
and further foster the development of ecological farming through 
participatory strategies. The NGO imposed certain conditions on 
how these strategies would be implemented, encouraging Revathi 
to use a model that they claimed had been demonstrated effective 
throughout the developing world. The model consisted of forming 
‘community-based organisations’ (CBOs) within villages to work on 
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issues of resource management, with a focus on ecological farming. 
CBOs were established either for specific tasks, such as preparing 
bio-inputs or developing livelihood options for landless people, or 
to empower particular villages or neighbourhoods. The bio-input 
CBOs were perhaps most popular, as they provided villagers with an 
opportunity to produce organic inputs (made predominantly through 
cow urine) which they could then sell to practicing ecological farmers. 
CBOs would be financed through a ‘revolving fund’ – essentially a 
micro-credit program. Both the NGO and the local community would 
contribute towards this fund. The CBO would then collectively decide 
how funds could be distributed as loans to members of the community, 
specifically in relation to the purchasing of assets for tsunami recovery 
and transitioning to ecological farming (for example, purchasing cows 
or building ponds). Once established, CBOs would then be encouraged 
to ‘federate’ at a regional level, to form a large governing body, to which 
the local CBOs would send delegates. After several years of working on 
this project, Revathi’s experience ultimately left her feeling unsatisfied 
and exposed some of the limitations of the facilitative model in the 
context of large international NGO-sponsored initiatives.
The use of community-based organisations in development 
emerged in the 1990s and has become a key component of the 
more institutionalised participatory development strategies around 
the world. As Dill (2009) outlines, CBOs are generally unpaid self-
help groups, which are intended to function as intermediaries for 
development interventions. They provide a formal structure through 
which ‘participation’ can take place, such that interventions can be 
more easily documented and groups can be more easily recognised as 
legitimate by local bodies. Revathi had initially hoped to form CBOs 
around specific tasks relating to ecological agriculture, such as the 
preparation of bio-inputs or marketing, but eventually a large number 
of groups came forward to register as CBOs. After facilitating a 
number of such CBOs throughout the Cauvery Delta region, Revathi 
encouraged them to ‘federate’ as a district-level entity. The ‘federation’ 
of CBOs has also become an important aspect of the participatory 
development strategies, as it theoretically allows individual CBOs 
to maintain their autonomy, whilst making the collective decision to 
pool resources and cooperate with other groups for mutual benefit 
(Appadurai 2002). Revathi suggested the name Kadal Oosai for the 
district level federation. This name, literally meaning ‘the voice of 
the sea,’ reflected the coastal identity of farmers, and signalled their 
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willingness to ‘raise their voice’ in the context of regional neglect. 
During our interviews in 2010, Revathi made mostly positive 
comments about her work on this project. She saw it as an extension 
of her work as a facilitator, which enabled her to provide support and 
guidance, whilst giving communities the power to ultimately make 
their own decisions. She suggested that Kadal Oosai had developed as 
a completely autonomous federation, with each subgroup formulating 
their own rules, delegating responsibilities, and organising regular 
meetings: it was, in her words, ‘completely managed by the farmers and 
the landless labourers.’ She explained her own, somewhat curtailed 
role as follows:
We are not strictly telling any rules and regulations to them. We 
tell them, wherever there is a need, they have to collectively raise their 
voice, and collectively purchase things and collectively market their 
products. For these things we gave our training, our facilitation, and 
until today we are supporting them.
Despite this optimism in 2010, by the time of our second series of 
interviews, in 2014, Revathi had become disillusioned with the CBO/
federation model. She had three major concerns. The first reflected 
concerns raised in the wider literature that CBOs tend to form along 
lines of caste and kinship groups and hence become exclusivist (see 
Dill 2009; de Wit and Berner 2009). In 2010, Revathi had been clear 
that CBOs needed to be inclusive if Kadal Oosai was to function in 
the manner she had hoped and, to that end, she had explicitly opposed 
caste, gender and class discrimination within Kadal Oosai: 
[W]e told them strictly that real involvement of people is our 
aim, so we cannot support the caste system… And we told strictly in 
the elected bodies like the district resource centre, we cannot exclude 
people from low castes... They should be given proper space. And 
women’s participation is also very important… So [we told them] fifty 
per cent of the space is provided to women. 
Despite these attempts to promote inclusivity, by 2014, Revathi 
was forced to accept that various forms of discrimination had entered 
into the CBOs, particularly along caste lines. While all CBOs were 
intended to be open to all castes, it became apparent that over time 
they became dominated by particular castes and eventually degenerated 
into caste associations. In the ‘master farmer’ model, Revathi could 
encourage the formation of relations of economic dependency 
between castes, but when groups were allowed to proliferate on their 
own, they tended to be more insular. As Revathi explained, ‘Whoever 
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could make a group, they joined together – that is, according to their 
caste, or neighbourhood3 or according to their status or according to 
their education.’ 
When Revathi raised this issue with the international NGO 
funding the project, they suggested that this could be overcome by 
having village and district level federations, with delegates from all 
CBOs theoretically providing representation to all castes within the 
communities. This, however, neglected the fact that in the context of 
intense caste discrimination, lower caste delegates would have very 
little influence or decision-making capacity within the village-level 
federations. Furthermore, she noted that when community events were 
held to try to bring the different CBOs together, overt practices of 
untouchability were observed, with lower caste and upper caste people 
being fed from different vessels. Revathi was highly disappointed by this 
and felt that it reflected a flaw in the CBO-federation model. As has 
been noted elsewhere (Dill 2009), the model rests on the problematic 
assumption that electoral representation can overcome entrenched 
discrimination. This neglects the fact that in many developing countries, 
electoral representation is mired in clientelism and elite bias, which 
make it very easy for traditional elites to ‘capture’ positions of power, 
both within the localised community-based organisations and in the 
larger federated bodies. As has occurred in many other documented 
examples, local power structures subverted the potential of CBOs as a 
pathway to inclusive participatory development.
Revathi’s second concern was with the use of loans as a method of 
distributing funds. She strongly believed that money was no substitute 
for training. For her methods of ecological farming, assets were not 
as important as knowledge in ensuring success. Further, she had seen 
that many of the problems affecting rural India had been caused by 
indebtedness, and that distributing more loans could not be a solution, 
particularly given that loans were repaid with interest. She witnessed 
that many farmers were taking loans from revolving funds for non-
productive purposes, such as weddings, which she attributed to a 
lack of experience dealing with larger sums of cash. She also heard of 
communities harassing and abusing people for non-payment. 
Finally, Revathi became convinced that the CBO model was 
inherently exploitative. The sponsoring NGOs had demanded 
rigorous bookkeeping from CBOs, which most rural people lacked 
the education and skills to maintain. They were therefore forced to 
employ outsiders to do their bookkeeping, with money coming from 
21Beyond the Participatory Development Impasse
their collective fund. This left Revathi feeling particularly uneasy. 
Furthermore, whether giving up their own time, or employing an 
outsider, Revathi began to question whether these bookkeeping tasks 
constituted a service that rural people should have been able to expect 
from the state or banks. Revathi questioned who the real beneficiaries 
of such operations were and suspected that the funding NGO may 
have come under the influence of vested interests. The small amount 
of money disbursed through micro-loans were not sufficient to make 
significant improvements in people’s lives. It would, however, make a 
significant contribution to the financial institutions, as collective funds 
served to consolidate dispersed rural savings, without the substantial 
associated bookkeeping costs (these costs being borne by the 
communities themselves). When Revathi raised this concern with the 
sponsoring NGO, she was told that her attitude was ‘immature’ and 
that this model had been tested and was being used all over the world. 
Ultimately, however, Revathi’s view was vindicated. Farmers came to 
reject the CBO model. In most cases, they divided the group savings 
and distributed them amongst members, after numerous problems 
with repayments. 
After this experience, Revathi became more convinced of the merits 
of ‘master farmer’ model. This model was not based on representation, 
which could be subverted by the powerful, but on economic 
empowerment and cooperation. Having a master farmer and set of 
fellow farmers from various local caste groups encouraged relations 
of mutual dependence and support within the community. Further, 
it provided communities with what Revathi believed was the most 
crucial factor required to transition to ecological farming: technical 
knowledge. A well-trained, well-equipped master farmer could fill in 
gaps in project implementation, identifying problems at the grassroots 
level and requesting outside support where required. Revathi firmly 
believed that with the CBO model, much of the technical know-how 
and economic empowerment was lost, as at least half of communities’ 
energy was spent in the formation and maintenance of groups. The 
facilitation of political empowerment was surely a priority, yet Revathi 
believed that this would evolve naturally, as communities became more 
empowered at the grassroots level, by cooperatively taking control of 
their farming systems. 
The case of Kadal Oosai highlights the very different ways in 
which ‘facilitation’ can be interpreted in the context of participatory 
rural development projects. Revathi conceptualized her primary task 
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as facilitating ‘movements.’ By this, she implied building unity amongst 
farmers, their capacity to share knowledge and ‘raise their voice’ 
if their rights were infringed. For her donor, however, the objective 
was to facilitate the formation of CBOs and microfinance initiatives, 
developing communities’ capacity to provide services for themselves. 
This discrepancy lays bare the fundamental ambiguity in the facilitator’s 
role and the fact that what one facilitates is never simply the choice 
of the ‘empowered community.’ The facilitator’s input always has 
some impact on the choices that are available to rural communities. 
Given this, understanding the outcomes of facilitative approaches 
to rural development, requires careful attention to the institutional 
context in which development organisations are embedded and the 
interests being served. Donor organisations, which frequently act as 
institutional agents for neoliberal development, often have different 
interests to those professed. 
LONG TERM IMPACT IN THE CAUVERY DELTA
During fieldwork in late 2014, I visited a village outside the town 
of Nagapattinam in the Cauvery Delta. In-depth interviews with 
seven villagers not only allowed Revathi’s claims to be cross-checked, 
but also provided great insights into which aspects of her work had 
enduring impacts. The findings provided support for Revathi’s claim 
that a focus on economic empowerment would have a greater impact 
than micro-credit programs, CBOs or regional federations, though 
the reasons for this may have differed from those that Revathi had 
supposed. 
Revathi’s ‘master farmer’ model had clearly had an impact in this 
village. Mathew,4 a retired public servant with five acres of land, had 
been selected as a master farmer by Revathi shortly after tsunami 
recovery work began. He was chosen due to his interest in ecological 
farming and leadership qualities. With Revathi’s facilitation, Mathew 
established a network of some 10-20 ‘fellow farmers’ from his village 
who he supported in their transition to ecological farming. He also 
subsequently become involved in a range of campaigns in defence of 
farmers in the region, and at the time of fieldwork in 2014, was deeply 
involved in a campaign to increase water allocations to the Cauvery 
Delta. At the time of research, Mathew’s network of ecological 
farmers continued to maintain contact and supportive relations, 
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though were not meeting as frequently as in the past. The members of 
this group who were interviewed, including Mathew himself, referred 
to Mathew as the ‘guru’ of the group, who provided advice whenever 
needed to his ‘disciples’.
Importantly, this supportive network did not appear to be 
dominated by any particular community. Revathi had facilitated 
this collaborative group in such a way that it was composed of 
members of various castes and religious groups and both small and 
large landholding farmers. One particularly prominent member of 
this network, a dalit woman named Lalita, developed as a leader in 
her own right. Recognising the need for more cows in the village 
to provide bio-inputs to support ecological farming, Revathi had 
encouraged landless households to revive their traditions of animal 
husbandry. Animal husbandry had become a stigmatised livelihood 
in the region, due to associations with illiteracy and low caste status. 
With Revathi’s backing, Lalita encouraged landless people in the 
village to recognise the dignity in this form of labour, and promoted 
keeping cows as a means to generate livelihoods. With some financial 
support from the ‘revolving fund,’ these communities had purchased 
cows and were making income through the sale of milk to consumers 
and cow dung and urine as inputs for ecological farmers. The relations 
of mutual dependence that this created helped to sustain connections 
and positive relations within the group. Like Mathew, Lalita had 
also gone on to develop as a leader on other issues, representing dalit 
women at the local Gram Sabha,5  highlighting the empowering 
effects of Revathi’s interventions for members of various social strata. 
In terms of the technical practices of ecological farming, the farmers 
who received training acknowledged that Revathi’s input was more 
than adequate. One small-holding farmer, Madhu, was particularly 
vociferous on this point, advising that he had already gained much 
from Revathi. Indeed, despite a lack of formal education, he was able 
to recite the technical knowledge of agro-ecological processes that 
Revathi had imparted, years after her departure. Emphasising that he 
did not expect or require any further support from Revathi, Madhu 
stated that: 
Training is over. They have given us everything we need – 
they taught us how to cultivate. I’ll say that that is what we 
are doing now [cultivating]. After studies, you go out to 
work.
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The continuation of this network of farmers and their confidence in 
practicing ecological farming provides evidence in support of Revathi’s 
interventions; yet, comments from villagers also suggested some 
limitations to her approach and of her participatory methods. Perhaps 
Revathi’s most problematic assumption was that farmers would be able 
to take over the leadership of the collective structures whose formation 
she had facilitated. Villagers noted that Revathi’s involvement with 
their communities was intermittent and decreased over time. She 
helped to facilitate group formation between her time doing tsunami 
and hurricane restoration abroad and elsewhere in India. From 2008 
onwards, her role was highly truncated. Firmly holding to the view 
that her role was to provide rural communities with the tools required 
to organise and lead their own ‘movements,’ it was important to her 
that her role would become less significant over time. Nonetheless, 
this was at odds with community expectations. Villagers spoke highly 
of Revathi’s work in tsunami restoration, yet, perhaps because of this 
positive impact, there was a sense of abandonment when she withdrew. 
This was clearly articulated by Mathew, who attributed the collapse of 
village level collectives and Kadal Oosai to the fact that Revathi left 
so abruptly. He reported that after Revathi’s departure, rather than 
farmers taking over the leadership of Kadal Oosai, a new NGO named 
BRIGHT5 arrived on the scene. This new NGO was unable to provide 
adequate support. 
While Revathi was here, everything was smooth. Then it 
changed. After BRIGHT came, everything was broken. While 
she was there, she took care of us, but after she left, nobody 
bothered. BRIGHT was there, but Revathi, when she left, she 
washed her hands of us. Not even a phone call in eight years. 
Given that, earlier in the interview, Mathew had referred to Revathi 
as Amma (mother), the use of the phrase ‘washed her hands’ (kai 
kazhuvirathu) is particularly poignant here, implying a relinquishing 
maternal responsibilities. The sense of abandonment was palpable. In 
his view, more work needed to be done, so that he could take over the 
coordination process and promote ecological farming more effectively.7 
He felt that BRIGHT was completely unable to replace Revathi as a 
facilitator of Kadal Oosai, emphasising that its leader lacked her mental 
maturity (manapakavaum) and financial backing. It was suggested that 
BRIGHT had used Kadal Oosai as a means of generating income 
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for itself, with NGO workers charging communities bookkeeping 
fees for managing their collectives. Farmers were aware that this was 
exploitative and unimpressed by BRIGHT’s leadership, which led to 
the eventual collapse of the Kadal Oosai federation. 
The collapse of Kadal Oosai suggests another reason for the 
weakness of Revathi’s model in the current institutional climate. 
On the one hand, communities were not entirely equipped to take 
control of this movement for themselves, refuting a core assumption 
of the participatory strategy – namely, that leadership can eventually 
be completely transferred to communities. Indeed, communities 
evidently expected Revathi to stay on and provide ongoing leadership 
and guidance. On the other hand, there were other NGOs who 
stood to profit from taking the collective structures under their wing, 
continuing relations of dependency and patronage. Once again, 
institutional context cannot be ignored. Other NGOs will always 
be present, and may intervene in ways that undermine processes of 
grassroots empowerment. 
While the ‘Master Farmer’ model appears to have been more 
successful in the long term, there were some signs that this, too, could 
have benefitted from more ongoing support from Revathi. It was 
certainly an achievement that in 2014, ten years after the tsunami, the 
collective of 10-20 farmers in Mathew’s village were still maintaining 
their supportive relationship and continued practicing ecological 
farming. Yet, not all farmers in the village were doing so. Indeed, it 
seems that beyond this 10-20 persons, most in the village had gradually 
returned to chemical farming. Mathew claimed that this occurred at 
the same time as Revathi was withdrawing. This created problems 
even for practicing natural farmers, as the use of flood-irrigation in 
the paddy-growing region had led to the cross-contamination of their 
fields by their neighbour’s chemicals, making organic certification 
impossible. 
An even clearer indication of the potential benefits of Revathi 
maintaining more sustained contact came from Lalita. Lalita’s 
determined efforts to encourage local women to purchase cows 
for livelihood generation were ultimately undermined by external 
circumstances. She had convinced more than ten local women to save 
money to purchase cows and she, herself, was raising four. Yet, this 
was to be tragically interrupted when an outbreak of foot and mouth 
disease resulted in the deaths of all of Lalita’s cows and of many others 
in the village. The others who had bought cows at her suggestion felt 
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betrayed, and this, she said, had undermined the collectives that were 
developing within the village. Some ongoing support from Revathi 
may have assuaged the economic and social backlash that Lalita 
encountered as a result of these circumstances. This demonstrates that 
participatory strategies do not inevitably lead to outcomes that are 
empowering. It cannot be assumed that after a brief intervention by 
development workers, communities can be left to take over, particularly 
given the unpredictability of the natural and social environment in 
which they operate.  
CONCLUSION
Participatory approaches to sustainable rural development clearly have 
their merits. This is particularly true when development workers are 
seen as ‘urban outsiders’ in their target communities, whose knowledge 
of local agricultural conditions may be questioned. A disposition 
towards ‘facilitation’ rather than ‘leadership’ encourages development 
workers to listen to community needs and aspirations and to merely 
provide support in areas of shared interest. Further, it encourages rural 
communities to take leadership into their own hands. In the case of 
ecological farming, this is important, as local people’s advice may be 
taken as more authoritative than that of an outsider and the results 
can be witnessed first-hand. Revathi clearly recognised these factors 
and felt that it was essential for her to avoid taking a leadership role if 
communities were to overcome entrenched disadvantage.
Nonetheless, this case study also reaffirms many of the critical 
observations made in the literature on participatory development, 
suggesting that some aspects of the model may need to be rethought. 
In particular, the forms of participation that the development worker 
facilitates may need to be limited to specific domains, if participation 
is to be genuinely empowering, non-exploitative and to avoid elite 
capture. Revathi’s experiences suggest that it may be appropriate to 
curtail facilitation to building relations of economic cooperation, 
particularly amongst disadvantaged sections of rural communities, 
rather than facilitating community-based organisations to represent 
community needs. This acknowledges four important points. First, that 
whether it is acknowledged or not, the facilitator always has some kind 
of agenda, and the question of what they facilitate is never neutral. 
Development workers need to acknowledge that even if they gesturally 
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allow communities to set the agenda, they still enter communities with 
a degree of power and their input, however light-handed, is influential. 
Revathi clearly was only interested in ‘facilitating’ non-chemical forms 
of agricultural practice, though she left it to communities to evaluate 
the merits of her approach for themselves. Given that these choices 
are inevitable, the facilitator should be explicit about their interests, 
and make a decision to facilitate developments that are effective, 
sustainable, and empowering.
Secondly, social and institutional context has a substantial impact 
on what one facilitates and whether it is likely to be effective. This 
includes the institutional influences on facilitators (from the donors, 
the state, etc.), the influence of local elites over any collective structures 
formed and the influence of other NGOs who form part of the 
local social environment. Although the facilitator may have a strong 
personal commitment to allowing rural communities (particularly the 
marginalised) to set their own agenda and lead their own movement, 
any of these additional influences can derail this process – often in subtle 
ways that are difficult to detect. These influences are more substantial 
and counter-productive within ‘community-based organisations’ with 
representative structures since, particularly in developing countries 
such as India, representative politics is mired in relations of patronage 
and clientelism, making CBOs prone to elite capture. 
Thirdly, while it may seem reasonable to assume that it is always 
best to facilitate local participation to the greatest extent possible, 
in some cases, participation can be exploitative. When designing 
rural development interventions, one must be cautious to ensure 
that participation will have directly empowering effects. As Revathi 
became all-too-aware, often ‘people’s participation’ is simply code-
word for displacing responsibilities from the government and finance 
sectors onto communities. This is particularly the case when group 
formation and maintenance requires arduous bookkeeping and other 
administrative burdens, which rural people are generally ill-equipped 
to take on themselves. 
Finally, aspects of the facilitative model are clearly not aligned 
with community expectations. In particular, the case study shows 
that communities may expect NGOs to commit to a long-term 
involvement with them, rather than a complete transfer of leadership 
from the NGO to the community. As the interviews with Revathi’s 
target communities demonstrated, people did not share Revathi’s 
assumption she could withdraw as communities took the movement 
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for ecological farming into their own hands. Rather, they wanted her 
ongoing support, education, and guidance. The amount of time that 
a facilitator is expected to spend in communities and the extent of 
their long-term involvement is an ambiguity within the participatory 
development model that needs ironing out. 
These four factors suggest important limitations to participatory 
approaches to sustainable rural development. Importantly, however, 
they do not imply a need to abandon the participatory approach 
altogether, but rather to limit its scope to domains in which it can 
be most effective and least detrimental. The case study suggests that 
a focus on facilitating economic cooperation may be most suited. 
Revathi’s ‘master farmer’ model, which was based on knowledge 
sharing, cooperation and building relations of mutual dependence, 
proved to be durable even after her departure. Although it did not lead 
to a spreading of ecological farming techniques, as she had hoped, it 
did make a meaningful long-term impact on the lives of those directly 
involved. Such cooperative structures are less likely to degenerate into 
caste-based organisations or be subject to elite capture, particularly 
if they have been designed in such a way as to promote cooperation 
between diverse sections of communities. Sustained involvement from 
facilitators, however, appears to be crucial, to ensure that community 
innovations are successful (and to buffer experiences of failure) and 
to prevent co-option of such groups by other NGOs who may have 
ulterior motives. Further, in keeping with the basic assumptions of 
participatory development, the development worker should take a 
backseat throughout and allow a substantial role for communities 
in agenda-setting. This, however, may be difficult to achieve in the 
current institutional climate, in which community-based organisations 
and micro-credit programs remain in vogue amongst major donors. At 
this level, some core assumptions need to shift, as there is now ample 
evidence that CBOs and community-policed micro-finance come 
with levels of risk that are not worth taking, particularly in South Asia. 
Revathi’s experiences align with those of many others identified in 
the literature on participatory development. Whether or not her focus 
on economic empowerment can provide a satisfactory alternative 
in all settings certainly requires further research attention. What 
development workers can certainly take inspiration from, however, is 
her determined effort to avoid aspects of the participatory development 
model that have decisively not worked and to develop alternatives that 
are suitable to ground realities. In this sense, her example provides 
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useful lessons for the development community at large on overcoming 
the current participatory development impasse.  
NOTES
1 As the purpose of the research was to evaluate the holistic impact of Revathi’s 
interventions and the reasons that particular interventions were successful or 
otherwise, qualitative methods, particularly interviews, provided far more relevant 
data than quantitative research could have. 
2 For confidentiality purposes, this NGO is not named.
3 Neighbourhoods in rural Tamil Nadu are generally segregated according to caste 
and religion. 
4 All names given to these informants are pseudonyms. 
5 Gram Sabhas (or Gram Panchayats) are local elective governments in India’s villages. 
6 A pseudonym.
7 This resonates well with Ricks’ (2016) recent study, which found that regular 
interaction was more likely to lead to positive outcomes in participatory development 
projects than training programs.
REFERENCES
Achuthan, N. S. 2009. Four years beyond tsunami: contours of a roadmap for a 
coordinated “multi-hazard (including tsunami) risk management action plan for 
tsunami-affected villages in Tamil Nadu:” overview of ongoing/projected initiatives. 
Disaster Prevention and Management 18(3): 249-269.
Alexander, K. C. 1975. Characteristics of the agrarian social structure of Tamil Nadu. 
Economic and Political Weekly 10(16): 664-672.
Alvarez, C. 2009. The Organic Farming Sourcebook (3rd ed.). Goa: Other India Press. 
Appadurai, A. 2002. Deep democracy: urban governmentality and the horizon of politics. 
Public Culture 14(1): 21-47.
Arya, A. S., Mandal, G. S., and Muley, E. V. 2006. Some aspects of tsunami impact and 
recovery in India. Disaster Prevention and Management 15(1): 51-66.
Chambers, R. 1997. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. London: ITDG Publishing.
Cooke, B. 2004. Rules of thumb for participatory change agents. In Participation: from 
Tyranny  to Transformation?, v S. Hickey & G. Mohan,  42-55. London: Zed Books.
Cooke, B., and Kothari, U. 2001. The case for participation as tyranny. In Participation: The 
New Tyranny?, ed. B. Cooke & U. Kothari, 1-15.  London: Zed Books.
de Wit, J., and Berner, E. 2009. Progressive patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and 
the Limits to Slum Dwellers’ Empowerment. Development and Change 40(5): 927-
947.
Dill, B. 2009. The paradoxes of community-based participation in Dar es Salaam. 
Development and Change 40(4): 717-743.
Djurfeldt, G., Athreya, V., Jayakumar, N., Lindberg, S., Rajagopal, A., and Vidyasagar, R. 
2008. Agrarian change and social mobility in Tamil Nadu. Economic and Political 
Weekly 43(45): 50-61.
Dwyer, A. 2011. Broke but Unbroken. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
Engberg-Pedersen, L., and Webster, N. 2002. Introduction to political space. In In the 
Name of the Poor: Contesting Political Space for Poverty Reduction, ed. N. Webster 
& L. Engberg-Pedersen, 1-29.  London: Zed Books.
30 Social Transformations Vol. 4, No. 2, Sep. 2016 & Vol. 5, No. 1 Mar. 2017
Frankel, F. R. 1971. India’s Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Ghosh, S. 2009. NGOs as political institutions. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 44(5): 
475-495.
Green, M. 2000. Participatory development and the appropriation of agency in Southern 
Tanzania. Critique of Anthropology 20(1): 67-89.
Green, M. 2010. Making development agents: participation as boundary object in 
international development. Journal of Development Studies 46(7): 1240-1263.
Harris, J., Jeyaranjan, J., and Nagaraj, K. 2010. Land, labour and caste politics in rural Tamil 
Nadu in the 20th century: Iruvelpattu (1916-2008). Economic and Political Weekly 
45(13): 47-61.
Harriss-White, B., and Janakarajan, S. 1997. From Green Revolution to rural industrial 
revolution in South India. Economic and Political Weekly 32(25): 1469-1477.
Hayward, C., Simpson, L., and Wood, L. 2004. Still Left Out in the Cold: Problematising 
Participatory Development and Research. Sociologia Ruralis 44(1): 95-108.
Masaki, K. 2010. Rectifying the anti-politics of citizen participation: insights from the 
internal politics of a subaltern community in Nepal. Journal of Development Studies 
46(7): 1196–1215. 
Mosse, D. 2001. ‘People’s knowledge’, participation and patronage: operations and 
representations in rural development. In Participation: The New Tyranny, ed. B. 
Cooke & R. Kothari, 16-35. London: Zed Books.
Platteau, J.P. 2004. Monitoring elite capture in community-driven development. 
Development and Change 35(2): 223-246.
Pretty, J. 1995. Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture. World Development 
23(8): 1247-1263.
———. 2002. Social and Human Capital for Sustainable Agriculture. In Agroecological 
Innovations: Increasing Food Production with Participatory Development, ed. N. 
Uphoff, 47-57. London: Earthscan.
Ricks, J. 2016. Building participatory organisations for common pool resource 
management: water user group promotion in Indonesia. World Development 77: 
34-47. 
Shaw, L., Lubell, M., and Ohmart, C. 2011. Evolution of local partnerships for sustainable 
agriculture. Society and Natural Resources 24(10): 1078-1095.
Uphoff, N. 2002. The agricultural development challenges we face. In Agroecological 
Innovations: Increasing Food Production with Participatory Development, ed. N.  
Uphoff, 3-19. London: Earthscan.
Vincent, S. 2004. Participation, resistance and problems with the ‘local’ in Peru: towards 
a new political contract? In Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation?, ed. S. 
Hickey & G. Mohan, 111-124. London: Zed Books.
Welker, M. 2012. The Green Revolution’s ghost: unruly subjects of participatory 
development in rural Indonesia. American Ethnologist 39(2): 389-406.
TRENT BROWN, Ph.D., is a research assistant at the Australia India Institute at the 
University of Melbourne. His doctoral thesis, completed at the University of Wollongong 
in 2013, examined sustainable rural development initiatives in India. His broader research 
interests include rural development, urbanisation, youth, sustainability and social and 
political theory. <trentpbrown@gmail.com>
